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ABSTRACT: The European economic crisis has brought economic hardship and prolonged instability to 
many countries in the European Union. While economies are struggling to recover, citizens have opted to 
become more vocal unconventionally. Mass protest, public occupations and demonstrations have domi-
nated Europe. Yet, numbers of people choosing to protest need to be assessed to verify whether the eco-
nomic recession is indeed responsible for a surge in protest activism on the continent. With the use of 
multiple rounds from the European Social Survey (2006-2012), this article tests the hypothesis linking un-
conventional political behavior in Europe to the economy. Findings suggest that overall European protest 
levels are not higher after the crisis, although confrontational activism has spiked in few countries. Eco-
nomic variables retain instead an important role in the explanation of protest in the post-recession era, 
with both objective and subjective economic measures supporting a grievance theory explanation of why 
Europeans protest. Economic decline matters in the selection of protest as a mode of political participa-
tion.  
 
KEYWORDS: economic crisis, European public opinion, European Social Survey, grievance theory, protest  
 
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: Francesca Vassallo, email: francesca.vassallo@maine.edu 
 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(1) 2016: 101-126, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i1p101 
  
102 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Political participation in Europe since the global financial crisis has proven to be very 
healthy. European countries have witnessed waves of protest demonstrations against 
the economic decline and lower standards of living experienced by citizens. As the eco-
nomic standing of countries was deteriorating, Europeans became increasingly active, 
embraced unconventional modes of engagement and took over squares, streets and 
buildings with the intention of being heard (Della Porta 2015; Fominaya and Cox 2013). 
This article investigates the relationship between the economic crisis in Europe and the 
parallel development of confrontational activism among citizens in different countries. 
Did economic hardship lead to more people engaging in protest activity? Do all eco-
nomic indicators correlate similarly with unconventional participation? As citizens ex-
perience over time a harder economic reality, personal assessments of their own eco-
nomic wellbeing should have a stronger impact than objective economic indicators as 
the crisis continues. Subjective perceptions of the economy in Europe may have be-
come a more important explanatory variable than the usual economic factors govern-
ments use to determine their citizens’ approval of political decisions. 
The prolonged impact of the economic collapse that took place in 2008 has left the 
European Union (EU) in shambles. According to Eurostat data, overall EU unemploy-
ment rates rose from 6.3% in 2008 to 10.6% in 2012. Even worse, corresponding levels 
of youth unemployment, a key component of street protests (Hooghe 2012), increased 
from 14.9% in 2008 to 25.2% in 2012. As jobs disappeared, economic growth stalled. 
Real GDP growth rates from Eurostat were around 1.2% for the EU in 2008, and 0% 
four years later, confirming the long term impact of the crisis. Another measure of the 
severity of the financial crisis is the overall level of national debt (Roth, Nowak-
Lehmann 2011), which has led countries near a Eurozone exit (Kosmidis 2014). 
In this context of economic downturn, studies on global waves of protest have in-
spired research on country-specific cases where unconventional activism was becom-
ing dominant: from the Indignados movement in Spain (Calvo 2013), to the newly agi-
tated Portuguese society (Accornero and Pinto 2015) and the more well-known case of 
Syriza and anarchists alike in Greece (Rüdig and Karyotis 2014). Countries across Eu-
rope have been experiencing frequent protest participation in the aftermath of the 
global recession, as levels of support for national governments and conventional poli-
tics declined (Armingeon and Guthmann 2013). 
Previous scholarship on the relationship between the economy and unconventional 
activism has presented conflicting evidence on the predicting factors for protest. 
Whereas some scholars discussed a relationship between economic decline and con-
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frontational modes of engagement, due to a higher economic deprivation for citizens 
(Gurr, 1970; Beissinger and Sasse 2014; Kern, Marien and Hooghe 2015), other studies 
have presented findings on a link between wealth and protest, as citizens more well off 
have more resources available and can use the full spectrum of political participation 
modes to engage (Inglehart 1977; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton, van Sickle and 
Wheldon 2010).  
This research plans to investigate empirically whether expectations about more citi-
zens involved in protest after the economic crisis are accurate. In particular, this study 
also tests again the possible link between economic decline and unconventionality. If 
indeed the economic recession is responsible for more individuals taking to the streets, 
this can be measured by both objective economic variables as well as subjective inter-
pretations of economic wellbeing. The following section of the article introduces the 
debate on protest and how the literature has explained unconventionality. The data, 
hypotheses and statistical methods section is next, followed by the discussion of the 
findings. The conclusions section at the end of the paper sums up the article’s main 
contributions to the research on the economy and protest activism. 
 
 
2. The Debate on Protest 
 
The place of unconventionality in legitimate political activism started to be consid-
ered only in the 1970s. Barnes and Kaase (1979) brought protest into the main stream 
of political participation studies with their volume on different modes of political par-
ticipation, including protest as a relevant example of citizens’ political expression. Over 
the last four decades the literature on confrontational activism has progressively de-
veloped the role of contentious politics. An engaged citizen is now able to use both 
conventional (voting, working for a campaign, etc..) as well as unconventional (street 
demonstration, building occupation, etc…) actions to become active politically. Protest 
is today an accepted mode of activism across countries (Rucht 2007; Dalton 2014) and 
is part of the potential full repertory of actions available to today’s assertive citizens 
(Dalton and Welzel 2014). 
As contentious politics has become more present in democracies, studies have rec-
orded its overall long term increase in frequency and size (Inglehart and Catterberg 
2002; Norris 2002). This larger role for unconventionality among citizens has prompted 
sociologists, in particular, to recognize the development of a “movement society”: citi-
zens in different countries are now becoming more engaged in politics than before, es-
pecially through elite challenging actions and movements (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; 
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Dodson, 2011). The spread of protest has contributed to the normalisation of the pro-
tester (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). As more 
protest events take place, more people decide to participate and it is more likely for 
any individual to use unconventionality as a mode of political engagement1. In this 
background, it is expected for citizens in Europe to embrace protest as a form of politi-
cal expression in the wake of the economic collapse. Contentious activism was already 
widely accepted, even before the loss of economic status intervened. 
  
a) The Negative Relationship: Grievance Theory 
 
 A link between economic decline and protest choice has been explained in the 
literature on protest with the use of relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970). As citizens 
experience a loss, often measured economically2, they are more likely to react political-
ly and try all possible actions available to be heard. An objectively lower economic sta-
tus and a subjectively worse economic wellbeing collaborate to push citizens to 
demonstrate on the streets, occupy buildings, sign petitions and boycott products in 
the name of activism. As people feel the loss they suffered, their relative deprivation 
assessment convinces them to present their grievance to the political elites, hoping for 
changes. An economic loss turns into political dissatisfaction and political engagement. 
The economy becomes a relevant issue as its salience is expected to increase at 
times of crisis (Singer 2011), when a poor economy appears to be an even more crucial 
factor leading to activism. Macro level variables, such as GDP per capita and GDP 
growth are therefore negatively associated with contentious activism (Auvinen 1997; 
Dubrow, Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow 2008; Beissinger and Sasse 2014). Unem-
ployment and inflation rates in general are instead positively associated with protest, 
as the loss of a job, for instance, brings out a strong grievance in citizens (Hooghe 2012; 
Solt 2015; Kern et al. 2015). 
The personal interpretation of the economy does its part, with an individual’s overall 
level of wealth filtering the assessment of the actual performance of the economy. 
Generally, citizens have a good grasp on the level of economic success the country is 
experiencing: there is indeed a good correspondence between objective economic in-
 
1
 Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas (2011) have disputed the development of such movement society in the US 
and have instead claimed that higher protest levels are associated with cohort changes, without evidence 
of a spread of protest across citizens from different age groups. 
2
 The actual loss experienced does not have to be economic in nature. Issue-driven protest movements 
(groups protecting the environment or in support of same sex marriage for instance) can also quantify a 
possible loss without the use of economic measures. 
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dicators and subjective economic interpretations of personal wellbeing (Anderson and 
Hecht 2014). Micro level variables, such as satisfaction with income level or the econ-
omy at large, relevance of money in a person’s life, and similar others, have been asso-
ciated with unconventionality as well (Kern et al. 2015) Both macro and micro econom-
ic variables are useful to assess the explanatory power of the economy when predicting 
protest. As the economy and people’s interpretations of its performance deteriorate, 
the likelihood of contentious activism increases, with more grievances driving an indi-
vidual’s choice to protest3. 
 
b) The Positive Relationship: Resource Theory 
 
 Contrary to the expectations of grievance theory, a poor economic performance 
may not lead to more protest, according to scholars considering the level of resources 
available to an individual (Dalton et al. 2010; Welzel and Deutsch 2011; Jakobsen and 
Listhaug 2014). In this situation, the rationale actually suggests that economic success 
leads to confrontational activism. A better economic performance, assessed objectively 
and subjectively, encourages citizens to embrace all modes of political participation 
possible. Individuals in a context of wealth have more resources at their disposal to 
plan, organize and execute political action. They can find more time to organize, they 
can afford travel to participate in demonstrations and have generally a better access to 
information. In an interesting conundrum, governments whose policies deliver more 
wealth and growth overall, can indeed experience more citizen protest on different is-
sues. Ultimately, resource theory claims that in a democracy where economic devel-
opment is thriving, people will become more active citizens, learning to challenge the 
elites more consistently (Dalton and Welzel, 2014). Even when a personal interpreta-
tion of the economy is positive, citizens can still embrace protest, despite the lack of an 
economic grievance. 
 In the end, there are also other potential predictors of protest. While the discus-
sion in this article focuses primarily on economic indicators, previous studies have also 
highlighted the relevance of other factors. For instance, men tend to be more likely to 
engage in protest than women (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2014), although the gap 
 
3
 On this point, Solt’s findings (2015) using income inequality and objective economic indicators dis-
prove the validity of grievance theory, although the research includes data only up to 2009, right at the 
beginning of the economic crisis and probably too soon for citizens to feel the real cost of any loss. Kern et 
al. (2015) accept the relevance of grievance theory from 2008 to 2010, using a protest index, which in-
cludes petition signing, demonstration participation and product boycotts. The key economic measure in 
their study is unemployment. 
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is now closing (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 481). When it comes to age, younger in-
dividuals are more likely to engage in confrontational modes of participation (demon-
strations, occupations, etc..), a finding that is still consistent today (Caren, Ghoshal and 
Ribas 2011; Melo and Stockemer 2014). Political interest and level of education equally 
contribute to push a person towards protest activity: higher levels of political interest 
and education encourage confrontational action (Vassallo 2010; Melo and Stockmer 
2014). These two variables are often part of the overall level of political sophistication 
associated with a person. Information on politics, for instance, similarly supports a per-
son’s choice for protest. Finally, an individual’s ideological position and the person’s re-
ligious association membership have also been linked to protest. Citizens on the left of 
the political spectrum (Jakobsen and Listhaug 2014; Torcal, Rodon and Hierro 2015) are 
more likely to engage in contentious action, whereas people with a religious affiliation 
prefer conventional participation to confrontational activism (Norris et al. 2006). From 
the conventional side of activism, studies have also linked trust in politicians and voting 
to the selection of protest. The level of trust in politicians is inversely associated with 
protest activism, as citizens who trust politicians are more prone to let politicians solve 
their problems rather than challenge the elites they elected. Voting is directly linked to 
protest, as protesters have demonstrated to be able to employ all modes of political 
participation, without necessarily a preference for conventionality over unconvention-
ality (Vassallo 2010; Dalton 2014). 
 
 
3. Data, Hypotheses and Statistical Methods 
 
In order to test the relevance of economic indicators for predicting protest activities 
in the EU, before and after the 2008 economic crisis, this study includes four rounds of 
European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2006 through 20124. As ESS waves are con-
ducted every two years, the data provide a good temporal assessment of when chang-
es may have taken place in regards to levels of confrontational activism. Values from 
2006 will be a baseline for the variables before the economic collapse started, 2008 will 
 
4
 Kern at al. (2015) employed the same ESS data, but focused on the 2002-2010 period instead, stop-
ping only two years after the economic collapse. The study assessed the possible influence of economic 
decline in the very short term only, whereas it may take longer for people to feel the negative impact of a 
prolonged economic downturn, when the economy becomes a more salient issue. Additionally, this re-
search focuses on EU member states only, excluding other ESS countries such as Russia or Ukraine, where 
individual perception of economic loss due to the historical background of those countries may not follow 
the standards of citizens in EU societies. 
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provide information at the beginning of the financial downturn, 2010 and 2012 will be 
time points to assess how all measures have progressed after the economic recession 
hit. The research includes 25 European Union member states in total: 21 for all the 
rounds included, with the exception of 2008, when 24 EU members were surveyed. 
This sample approach provides a good validity for the level of economic expectations in 
EU countries and the repetition of the same questions for all the rounds helps with the 
reliability of the measures.  
This research focuses on protest activities measured with the use of three separate 
indicators: signing a petition, taking part in a lawful demonstration and boycotting cer-
tain products. All three measures have been employed in previous studies addressing 
the concept of protest (Dalton et al. 2010; Vassallo 2010; Solt 2015; Kern at al. 2015), 
as they are consistently part of the same dimension of protest across countries. In 
some cases, the three variables are also combined into a protest index (Vassallo 2010; 
Kern et al. 2015), whereas at times they are analyzed separately, due to its different 
characteristics (Dodson 2011; Melo and Stockmer 2014; Solt 2015): street demonstra-
tions are more demanding than petition signing or product boycotting. In this article, 
when a protest index is used, it is a scale from 0 to 4, where 1 point was given to sign-
ing a petition or boycotting a product, whereas taking part in a demonstration contrib-
utes 2 points to the index, as it requires more effort5. By all accounts, these are all ex-
amples of non-violent protest, with participation in a demonstration as the only meas-
ure of a more confrontational action. When the three protest indicators are analyzed 
separately, each of them is a dichotomous measure of 0/1, with 1 meaning that the in-
dividual has done that specific protest action in the previous 12 months. 
Two separate hypotheses are tested in the article. The first hypothesis deals with the 
possible shift in overall levels of protest in the EU at large, as well as in each EU mem-
ber considered, after the economic crisis started. As the economy was becoming more 
dominant in people’s assessment for possible satisfaction and political action, the ex-
pectations from grievance theory are that worse economic conditions after 2008 would 
lead to more citizens embracing protest, in comparison to before 2008. If instead re-
source theory is employed, protest levels after the financial meltdown are predicted to 
be lower due to a loss in resources. 
 
H1: Protest levels in the EU and in national EU members are higher after the econom-
ic recession than before. 
 
 
5
 See also Quaranta (2013) for possible issues and trade-offs in a protest index creation. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(1) 2016: 101-126, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i1p101 
  
108 
 
The second hypothesis in the study centers on the relevance of economic indicators. 
Expectations from relative deprivation explanations would be that a poor performing 
economy as well as a negative perception of economic wellbeing convince citizens to 
protest more. Scholars following resource theory would instead predict lower uncon-
ventionality when economic hardship and lower financial wellbeing are present. Data 
for the objective economic indicators included in the study come from Eurostat: GDP 
per capita in purchasing power standards (GDP PPS), youth unemployment6, real GDP 
growth, and inflation rate. Subjective economic variables in the analysis are from the 
ESS rounds: personal level of satisfaction with the economy, perception of satisfaction 
with household’s income, and importance of money and expensive things. The innova-
tive part of this hypothesis is testing the impact of citizens’ subjective economic as-
sessments in the presence of objective economic measures, which better represents 
the overall economic situation of a country. In light of the literature mentioned in the 
previous sections, the length of the economic crisis should contribute to underline the 
importance of a subjective economic perception in the determination of unconven-
tional political activism. 
 
H2: Both subjective and objective economic indicators are associated with higher pro-
test activism: lower GDP growth and GDP per capita measures are associated with 
higher protest levels, whereas higher inflation and unemployment rates are linked to 
higher unconventionality. Similarly, a worse subjective perception of economic wellbe-
ing corresponds to higher levels of contention in political activism. 
 
 Finally, other variables are controlled for in the hypothesis testing, following the 
literature in the previous section: gender, age, education, left-right ideological scale, 
religious affiliation, personal unemployment, political news and interest, trust in politi-
cians as well as voting. Descriptive statistics and binary logistic regressions with the 
three protest actions as separate dependent variables are employed to test the hy-
potheses. The binary outcome responses are from individual survey participants and 
these respondents can be considered “clustered” by countries, therefore there are two 
levels in the data, i.e., individual level and country level. A multilevel binary logistic re-
gression is used to model the protest action and fit country as random effect, with the 
data analysis performed in SPSS (see Heck, Tabata and Thomas 2012). The coefficients 
 
6
 Youth unemployment was preferred to adult unemployment in this study as publications on protest 
movements in Europe since the crisis focused in particular on the role of young citizens in open protest 
against the system (Hooghe 2012; Calvo 2013; Della Porta 2015). Youth unemployment is expected to be a 
stronger predictor of protest than adult unemployment. 
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in the multilevel binary logistic regressions are estimated by maximizing the penalized 
pseudo-likelihood (Breslow and Clayton 1993). The estimates of the variance compo-
nent of country effect are 0.237, 0.356 and 0.364, and the prediction accuracies are 
79.5%, 93.7% and 85.1% for signed petition, public demonstration and product boy-
cotting, respectively. 
 
 
4. Findings 
 
 The discussion of the hypothesis testing is divided into three sections. The next 
section addresses primarily findings concerning H1, whereas sections b) and c) present 
results regarding H2. 
 
a) Levels of Unconventionality in Europe 
 
Data on unconventional activism in Europe from 2006 to 2012 lead to different in-
terpretations when European level values are compared to national level indicators. 
Figure 1 presents overall percentages of individuals in the EU at large who engaged in 
signing a petition, participating in a lawful demonstration and boycotting a product 
within the previous 12 months. There is virtually no change before and after the 2008 
crisis, disputing claims of a protest wave across Europe. About 20% of Europeans 
signed a petition during the period considered, whereas the percentage of those who 
took part in a street demonstration in 2012 increased by about half from its original 
value in 2006. Yet, the final number (6.6% in 2012) is quite disappointing for a Europe-
an society so deeply affected by economic hardship. The percentage of individuals in 
the EU who decided to boycott a product went up to 15.7% by 2012, a small jump from 
six years earlier. 
If the overall percentage of individuals who did at least one of the three protest ac-
tions possible is overall stagnant, the actual number of actions EU citizens have de-
clared is equally disappointing. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of the protest index in 
the EU. From 2006 to 2012 at least 70% of EU citizens chose not to engage in any of the 
three possible protest activities recorded. Overall, less than 20% declared to have done 
only one of the possible unconventional activities, and on average less than 2% de-
clared to have done all three actions the previous 12 months, even in 2012. From this 
preliminary analysis of the data it appears that the 2008 economic crisis and its long 
term impact have not quite affected protest levels in a way grievance theory scholars 
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generally predict. No visible change can be seen at the EU level, even four years after 
the economic hardship started. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Unconventional Political Activism (%): EU Citizens – Overall 
20.60% 20.00%
4.50%
6.60%
13.40%
15.70%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Petitions Demostrations Boycotts
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012. “Petitions” is overall percentage of individuals from EU 
member states who stated they signed a petition the previous 12 months. “Demonstrations” is overall percentage of 
individuals from EU member states who stated they have taken part in a lawful public demonstration the previous 12 
months. “Boycotts” is overall percentage of individuals from EU member states who stated they boycotted certain 
products the previous 12 months. The number of EU member states included in ESS waves varies depending on the 
year: 21 in 2006, 2010 and 2012; 24 in 2008. Overall number of EU countries in 2006 was 25, but 27 from 2007 to 2012. 
 
 
A closer look at the individual EU member state provides instead a different picture. 
Tables 1a and 1b present individual country level data for each of the three protest ac-
tivities, including the national protest index average from the country sample, for each 
ESS round in the study (2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012). The first finding is that there is a 
good variety of preferences for unconventional behavior in EU countries. The top rank-
ing protest action group includes countries like France, Denmark, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom (UK) in 2006. Their national protest index average is between 0.73 and 
0.89. Whereas data for France show citizens employing each of the three possible pro-
test actions significantly, for Sweden and the UK the national preference is for petitions 
and boycotts over demonstrations. It is relevant to notice 
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Figure 2 - Distribution of EU Protest Index 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2006 2008 2010 2012
ESS rounds
4 3
2 1
0
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012. Index scale: 0 to 4. 1 point given for signing a petition or 
boycotting a product, 2 points given for participating in a lawful demonstration. Distribution is percentage of individuals 
at the EU level. 
 
that Spain has actually the highest EU percentage of people declaring to have demon-
strated in 2006 (17.8%)7. An assessment of the data for 2012 confirms some of the 
same countries still in the top rankings for protest activism: Sweden and France. Spain 
and Germany are also in 2012 scoring high on the protest index level. For the only time 
in the period considered, two EU countries have a national protest index average 
above 1: Spain with 1.02 and Sweden with 1.01. Four years after the economic crisis, 
Spain retains the highest percentage of people involved in demonstrations (25.9%), not 
a surprise with an unemployment rate that doubled over the same period (Eurostat). 
At the same time, levels of participation in street demonstrations have increased sub-
stantially in other countries. Both Ireland and Portugal more than doubled their respec-
tive percentage of citizens involved in demonstrations over the previous six years: 
11.7% and 6.9%. Unemployment levels for both nations also doubled over the same 
period, and GDP growth equally struggled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 The EU average in 2006 for people taking part in lawful demonstrations is only 4.5%. 
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Table 1a - Unconventional Political Activism: National Level (%) and Protest Index 
COUNTRY ESS 2006  ESS 2008  
EU Member 
States 
Signed 
Petition 
Taken Part in 
Lawful Demon-
stration 
Boycotted 
Certain 
Products 
Protest 
Index 
Signed 
Petition 
Taken Part in 
Lawful Demon-
stration 
Boycotted 
Certain 
Products 
Protest 
Index 
Austria 21.1 4.2 19.5 0.48 23.0 9.3 22.6 0.64 
Belgium 30.4 7.6 10.5 0.55 27.6 7.4 11.2 0.53 
Bulgaria 5.5 2.3 1.9 0.10 6.5 4.1 3.5 0.17 
Cyprus 10.4 2.5 4.8 0.19 6.3 2.3 6.1 0.16 
Czech Re-
public 
- - - - 15.2 4.5 7.4 0.30 
Denmark 36.1 7.5 25.0 0.75 33.9 9.3 21.5 0.74 
Estonia 6.6 2.3 4.8 0.15 8.0 2.1 5.6 0.17 
Finland 32.0 2.2 28.3 0.64 32.3 2.5 30.3 0.67 
France 33.9 16.5 26.1 0.89 33.6 15.3 27.7 0.91 
Germany 27.5 7.0 23.3 0.64 30.8 8.1 31.1 0.77 
Greece - - - - 4.3 6.1 14.4 0.30 
Hungary 5.7 3.8 4.5 0.16 6.8 1.8 5.9 0.16 
Ireland 25.0 5.2 12.3 0.45 24.1 9.8 13.6 0.57 
Italy - - - - - - - - 
Latvia 8.0 1.5 2.1 0.13 5.5 6.5 5.2 0.23 
Lithuania - - - - 8.9 3.9 2.0 0.18 
Netherlands 20.5 3.0 9.3 0.36 23.5 3.3 9.4 0.39 
Poland 5.4 1.4 4.0 0.12 7.5 1.6 4.5 0.15 
Portugal 4.7 3.1 2.3 0.14 4.9 3.7 3.2 0.15 
Romania 5.1 3.8 0.40 0.12 3.1 4.3 2.8 0.14 
Slovakia 18.3 2.9 10.0 0.33 19.8 1.7 7.3 0.30 
Slovenia 13.9 3.9 5.0 0.26 8.7 1.6 5.1 0.16 
Spain 22.5 17.8 10.1 0.69 17.0 15.9 7.9 0.56 
Sweden 44.3 4.8 30.6 0.85 47.2 6.4 37.3 0.96 
United 
Kingdom 
40.6 4.4 23.7 0.73 38.2 3.8 24.2 0.70 
EU 20.6 4.5 13.4 0.44 18.6 6.3 13.5 0.44 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2006, 2008, 2012. Some countries were not included in each wave of the survey. 
Values are national percentages of individuals who declared to have done that specific action during the previous 12 
months. Protest Index is average national score of scale (0-4): 1 point for signed petition, 1 point for boycott of product 
and 2 points for participation in lawful demonstration. No action on any of the possible contentious activities is 0 points. 
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Table 1b: Unconventional Political Activism: National Level (%) and Protest Index 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2006, 2008, 2012. Some countries were not included in each wave of the survey. 
Values are national percentages of individuals who declared to have done that specific action during the previous 12 
months. Protest Index is average national score of scale (0-4): 1 point for signed petition, 1 point for boycott of product 
and 2 points for participation in lawful demonstration. No action on any of the possible contentious activities is 0 points. 
 
A second group of countries from the EU shows instead the opposite end of the pro-
test index score. Bulgaria, Poland and Romania had a protest index average of 0.12 or 
less in 2006, yet three other Eastern European countries scored at the bottom of the 
protest ranking in 2012: Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia, with a similar value. In this 
context, countries in the EU still show preferences for political action and when it 
comes to unconventionality, newest member states from the East still highlight a much 
COUNTRY ESS 2010  ESS 2012  
EU Member 
States 
Signed 
Petition 
Taken Part in 
Lawful 
Demonstra-
tion 
Boycotted 
Certain 
Products 
Pro-
test 
Index 
Signed 
Petition 
Taken Part in 
Lawful 
Demonstra-
tion 
Boycott-
ed Cer-
tain 
Products 
Protest 
Index 
Austria - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 20.6 6.4 9.2 0.42 20.6 5.2 11.3 0.42 
Bulgaria 7.2 3.1 4.1 0.17 7.8 5.8 3.7 0.22 
Cyprus 7.0 5.0 4.7 0.21 10.7 4.5 10.2 0.29 
Czech Re-
public 
16.9 5.0 10.3 0.37 18.9 6.9 13.7 0.45 
Denmark 29.3 7.7 21.9 0.66 25.0 4.3 25.7 0.59 
Estonia 7.8 2.0 9.1 0.20 9.6 4.0 6.5 0.23 
Finland 27.6 1.4 33.1 0.63 23.7 1.5 34.9 0.61 
France 29.3 17.7 29.0 0.93 28.8 11.7 31.7 0.84 
Germany 30.6 8.4 30.0 0.77 34.9 9.1 35.8 0.86 
Greece 5.2 10.0 12.0 0.37 - - - - 
Hungary 2.8 2.7 6.1 0.14 3.0 3.6 3.7 0.13 
Ireland 16.3 7.0 9.2 0.39 23.6 11.5 11.2 0.54 
Italy - - - - 23.2 17.3 12.0 0.68 
Latvia - - - - - - - - 
Lithuania 14.8 3.5 3.5 0.23 6.0 2.1 1.9 0.10 
Netherlands 26.2 2.8 10.1 0.41 22.1 2.8 12.1 0.41 
Poland 10.7 2.0 4.9 0.19 10.4 2.3 5.7 0.21 
Portugal 5.0 2.4 2.0 0.11 7.5 6.9 2.9 0.25 
Romania - - - - - - - - 
Slovakia 21.4 1.9 7.0 0.31 20.1 4.1 10.4 0.37 
Slovenia 8.6 2.2 5.7 0.18 7.7 3.4 3.9 0.17 
Spain 26.4 18.3 11.6 0.74 33.2 25.9 17.4 1.02 
Sweden 37.2 4.9 35.6 0.82 43.6 7.3 42.8 1.01 
United 
Kingdom 
28.5 2.4 19.3 0.52 32.1 3.1 18.5 0.58 
EU 18.2 5.7 13.6 0.43 20 6.6 15.7 0.48 
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lower propensity for challenging actions against the elites, almost a decade after they 
entered the EU (Furusawa 2006). 
All other countries included in the project present levels of unconventionality that 
either slightly increase or even decrease (UK) during the period studied. In brief, coun-
tries that already had good protest participation before the crisis continued, and even 
increased, their unconventional activism. At the same time, most EU countries with av-
erage or low scores on protest remain stagnant, with few exceptions: Ireland and Por-
tugal for instance. H1 can only be accepted in part, as protest levels surged in few coun-
tries, but remained mostly unchanged at the EU level as well as in many EU members. 
 
b) The Impact of Economic Indicators: Subjective vs. Objective 
 
Results from multilevel logistic regressions presented in Table 2 compare directly the 
association between various economic indicators and the three protest measures em-
ployed as separate dependent variables. The preference for the three separate protest 
measures in the analysis helps to assess the effect of each economic factor on three 
types of protest actions requiring different efforts. The first impression from the statis-
tical findings is that most of the economic variables used are significant for all three 
protest measures. In the case of taking part in lawful demonstrations, all the coeffi-
cients for the objective and subjective economic factors are significant. Overall, real 
GDP growth and GDP per capita in PPS have a consistent association across all three 
protest measures. Yet the first economic variable supports expectations from the 
grievance theory analysis with higher GDP growth leading to a lower likelihood to 
demonstrate8, as there is no economic loss in growth. Coefficients for the second vari-
able, GDP PPS, confirm instead the expectations from resource theory with individuals 
experiencing higher GDP per capita more likely to engage in all three protest activities 
included. For the remaining that Spain has actually the highest EU percentage of peo-
ple declaring to have demonstrated in 2006 (17.8%)9. An assessment of the data for 
2012 confirms some of the same countries still in the top rankings for protest activism: 
Sweden and France. Spain and Germany are also in 2012 scoring high on the protest 
index level. For the only time in the period considered, two EU countries have a na-
tional protest index average above 1: Spain with 1.02 and Sweden with 1.01. Four years 
after the economic crisis, Spain retains the highest percentage of people involved in 
demonstrations (25.9%), not a surprise with an unemployment rate that doubled over 
 
8
 The coefficients for petition signing and product boycotting are not significant with Real GDP growth 
as an independent variable. 
9
 The EU average in 2006 for people taking part in lawful demonstrations is only 4.5%. 
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the same period (Eurostat). At the same time, levels of participation in street demon-
strations have increased substantially in other countries. Both Ireland and Portugal 
more than doubled their respective percentage of citizens involved in demonstrations 
over the previous six years: 11.7% and 6.9%. Unemployment levels for both nations al-
so doubled over the same period, and GDP growth equally struggled. 
For the subjective, individual level economic indicators, both satisfaction with the 
economy and importance of money have similar impacts on each of the protest 
measures. As the satisfaction with the economy increases, the likelihood of an individ-
ual to protest in any way declines. Citizens without any economic grievances seem to 
become more apathetic, at least unconventionally, and may easily resort to conven-
tionality if needed. Economic satisfaction does not lead to more resources and conten-
tious participation. When the economy is disappointing in the eyes of citizens, protest 
becomes a more relevant option, following the expectations from grievance theorists.  
The importance of money and expensive things has an interesting effect on the like-
lihood to embrace protest. Individuals who do not consider money and expensive 
things important are actually more likely to protest, suggesting that economic griev-
ances are not salient for them when choosing unconventionality: a check mark for re-
source theory expectations, in particular for the postmaterialist theory (Inglehart, 
1977) predicting higher unconventionality among citizens, unrelated to economic 
grievances. 
Finally, the impact of the household income perception on the person’s ability to live 
comfortably differs, depending on which protest action is considered. As an individual’s 
perception of the household income’s adequacy to allow for a comfortable life deterio-
rates, the person’s likelihood to engage in contentious politics increases. The subjective 
reading of a person’s economic life quality affects participation in lawful demonstra-
tion, yet at the same time suppresses the likelihood of petition signing or product boy-
cotting. In the case of this particular variable, it appears that its link to demonstrations 
supports the grievance theory predictions, yet the type of relationship it has with peti-
tions and boycotts suggests a more resource theory based explanation. When the per-
ception of a household’s income appropriateness worsens, citizens seem to associate 
more strongly with more demanding types of protest (demonstrations), possibly skip-
ping more moderate steps (petitions and boycotts) towards confrontational activism. 
Overall, the comparison of objective and subjective economic variables in the pre-
diction of protest in Europe depicts a scenario where at least five of the economic 
measures used support the expectations developed by grievance theory, with a poor 
economy and a declining subjective assessment of personal economic standing equally 
contributing to the selection of protest as a means of political expression. Economic 
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variables clearly matter when explaining unconventionality in Europe: H2 can be ac-
cepted. Moreover, the subjective economic perception variables in the model are al-
ways significant, contrary to the objective economic factors. 
 
Table 2: Multilevel Logistic Regressions: Parameter Estimates and Significance 
 
Variables Signing Petitions Taking Part in Lawful Demon-
strations 
Boycotting Certain Products 
 Coefficient and 
S.E. 
p values Coefficient and 
S.E. 
p values Coefficient and 
S.E. 
p values 
Individual Level (N=128281, 128506, 128225) 
Individual Demographics 
Gender: Male -0.251 (0.015) .000 0.060 (0.025) .015 -0.238 (0.017) .000 
Age -0.015 (0.001) .000 -0.021 (0.001) .000 -0.005 (0.001) .000 
Education 0.077 (0.002) .000 0.054 (0.003) .000 0.086 (0.002) .000 
Left/Right Scale -0.057 (0.004) .000 -0.148 (0.006) .000 -0.057 (0.004) .000 
Belonging to  
Religion: Yes 
-0.061 (0.016) .000 -0.163 (0.027) .000 -0.081 (0.019) .000 
Unemployed > 3 
Months: Yes 0.080 (0.017) .000 -0.006 (0.027) .817 0.160 (0.019) .000 
Individual Political Sophistication 
TV 
Politics 
News 
No time -0.026 (0.038)  -0.059 (0.060)  0.100 (0.044) 
.004 
Less than 
0.5 hr 
0.042 (0.022) .061 -0.024 (0.035) .091 0.082 (0.025) 
0.5-1 hr 0.036 (0.020)  -0.075 (0.032)  0.028 (0.022) 
Political Interest -0.449 (0.010) .000 -0.569 (0.016) .000 -0.535 (0.012) .000 
Trust in Politicians -0.024 (0.004) .000 -0.001 (0.006) .915 -0.083 (0.005) .000 
Vote 
 
Yes 0.370 (0.035) 
.000 
0.028 (0.050) 
.000 
0.308 (0.042) 
.000 
No -0.100 (0.039) -0.440 (0.058) -0.021 (0.046) 
Personal Economic Perception 
Satisfaction with 
Economy 
-0.023 (0.004) .000 -0.035 (0.007) .000 -0.016 (0.005) .000 
Household Income 
Perception 
-0.042 (0.011) .000 0.034 (0.017) .039 -0.062 (0.012) .000 
Importance of  
Money 
0.060 (0.006) .000 0.060 (0.010) .000 0.069 (0.007) .000 
Country Level (n=25) 
GDP PPS 0.020 (0.002) .000 0.008 (0.003) .013 0.017 (0.003) .000 
Youth 
Unemployment 
0.014 (0.002) .000 0.012 (0.003) .000 -0.000 (0.003) .961 
Real GDP Growth -0.000 (0.005) .977 -0.030 (0.008) .000 -0.006 (0.006) .321 
Inflation -0.007 (0.008) .394 0.048 (0.011) .000 -0.008 (0.010) .407 
ESS 
Round  
 
2006 0.207 (0.031) 
.000 
0.067 (0.052) 
.001 
-0.185 (0.035) 
.000 2008 0.126 (0.027) -0.076 (0.046) -0.141 (0.030) 
2010 -0.074 (0.025) -0.060 (0.039) -0.159 (0.028) 
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Dependent variables are: signing a petition over the previous 12 months, taking part in a lawful demonstration over the 
last 12 months and boycotting certain products over the previous 12 months. All dependent variables are dichotomous 
values: no/yes. 
 
two other economic variable s at the ma cro level, youth une mploy ment and inflation, their coeffici ents support the grievance the ory with higher inflation leadi ng to a higher likelihood of  
demonstration participation and hig her youth une mploy ment associate d to higher protest activism for petitions and de monstrations. F or the secti on on obje ctive economic variables , results from t he analysis confirm more consistently  grievance the ory predi ctions over resour ce the ory expe ctations .  
  
c) Driving Factors of Protest 
 
The complete picture for the prediction of likelihood of protest in an individual (Ta-
ble 2) suggests that most of the other control variables in the study actually have a sim-
ilar impact on the three protest measures, regardless of their different level of confron-
tational action. 
Regardless of the different levels of confrontational commitment required for the 
different protest actions. As already showed in previous research, older individuals are 
less likely to engage in protest activism at large, whereas men are more likely to take 
part in a street demonstration rather than signing a petition or boycotting a product. 
People with higher levels of education are more prone to engage in all unconventional 
activities, as are citizens on the left of the political spectrum. Significant positive coeffi-
cients for individuals who have ever experienced more than three months of unem-
ployment confirm a higher propensity to use petitions and boycotts. Association with a 
religion instead lead people to become less engaged unconventionally. The direction of 
all the coefficients corresponds to the expectations from the literature and suggests 
stability across time for the association between individual socio-demographic varia-
bles and political activism. 
In regards to the variables pertaining to the political sophistication sphere of an indi-
vidual, political interest and trust in politicians retain a similar relationship with all the 
protest activities considered. Lower levels of political interest are associated with less 
contentious activism, and similarly higher trust values in politicians correspond to less 
unconventionality. Citizens who are not interested in politics are less likely to embrace 
protest as it is a demanding political action. Individuals who trust politicians are also 
less likely to become active in confrontational ways as they are less likely to challenge 
elites they trust. Finally, when vote is taken into consideration (Figure 3a), an example 
of conventional activism, the profile of the protester represents the complete picture 
of a political activist. Generally, citizens who declared to have voted at the last election 
were also more likely to engage in protest, while respondents who were not eligible to 
vote were more prone to protest than people who did not vote and the effect is more 
pronounced for the lawful public demonstration. In conjunction with the direction of 
the political interest variable, the ideal profile of the protester once again suggests a 
good correspondence between the use of conventional and unconventional actions. 
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The political activist is indeed a citizen who embraces the full spectrum of modes of 
participation, from voting to taking to the streets to demonstrate (Barnes and Kaase, 
1979). 
The relevance of time to assess the severity of the economic crisis is confirmed in 
the coefficients for the ESS rounds (Figure 3b). The biggest change is in signing a peti-
tion, which shows a decrease after the 2008 crisis, while the likelihood for individuals 
to boycott a product or take part in a demonstration remains flat. It is indeed two years 
after the crisis when the probability for boycotts and petitions start to rise, although in 
a small measure. The likelihood to demonstrate remains virtually the same during the 
period considered in this research. As citizens seem to have embraced petitions and 
boycotts more after 2010 at the EU level, people are not selecting more demanding 
forms of protests, even in 2012.  
 
Figure 3a: Effect of Vote in Last Election on the Estimated Probabilities of an Individual Participating in Protest Activi-
ties 
 
Note: Predictors are fixed at their mean values. The error bar is the standard error of the estimated mean. 
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Figure 3b: Effect of the ESS Rounds on the Estimated Probabilities of an Individual Participating in Protest Activities  
 
Note: Predictors are fixed at their mean values. The error bar is the standard error of the estimated mean. 
 
An analysis for the salience of independent variables in the multilevel logistic models 
suggests that most of the significant relationships were as expected, with the direction 
of the associations remaining unchanged from previous research. Yet, the role of the 
economic variables, objective and subjective, confirms that predictions from grievance 
theory are more in line with the protest activities requiring less commitment, i.e. sign-
ing a petition or boycotting certain products. The time from the beginning of the eco-
nomic crisis did not make much of a difference in regards to participation in demon-
strations, but the likelihood of petition signing and product boycotting increased only 
two years after the crisis hit, suggesting the importance of a delayed effect in the way 
the perception of the economy affects protest activism. A longer study on the role of 
subjective economic perceptions might reveal a stronger impact for personal economic 
evaluations in explaining protest. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The 2008 global economic crisis severely affected European countries. Citizens were 
experiencing a worse economic situation and a prolonged recession that affected many 
economies for years. Some scholars of political activism have explained waves of public 
protest as a manifestation of people’s economic perception of their own wellbeing. 
With economic indicators deteriorating, mass demonstrations and square occupations 
were viewed as the activism choice of individuals reacting to their own economic 
grievances. An empirical assessment of the relationship between the economic down-
turn and unconventional political activism in the European Union suggests that the 
overall picture is not an example of a “movement society” (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998) 
or of an economically driven confrontational activism (Gurr, 1970).  
This article has presented evidence disputing the increase in unconventionality in 
European activism. Percentages of individuals signing a petition or boycotting certain 
products have remained stable, even four years after the crisis. Participation in street 
demonstrations has increased, but it remains quite low overall. The real jump in un-
conventionality has taken place instead in few selected EU members: Spain, Ireland 
and Portugal, for instance. These countries have witnessed a relevant surge in uncon-
ventionality since the recession started. After 2008 more people choose protest to ex-
press themselves politically, but only in few countries in Europe. 
The significance of economic indicators, discussed differently based upon the direc-
tion of the association, remains high. Both objective and subjective economic variables 
contribute to the explanation of protest, in particular with regards to demonstrations, 
a more demanding type of unconventional activism. Grievance theory scholars can 
claim that the economy is indeed a key factor to predict protest in Europe since the re-
cession, when it comes to signing a petition and boycotting certain products. Data sug-
gest that citizens have a good understanding of their economic status as both objective 
measures and subjective assessments help predict unconventionality. With the contin-
uation of the economic decline overall, personal economic perceptions seem to be 
more relevant to understand unconventionality.  
Finally, the last contribution from the research is that economic decline still matters 
for political activism. Although the literature on political behavior over the last three 
decades has focused primarily on the role of resources and wealth to understand and 
explain protest, recent events are crucial to look back at the relevance of economic 
based grievances in predicting protest. When economies are shrinking and the impact 
of a recession is prolonged, grievance theory retains its significance, as the longer the 
economic hardship experienced in a country, the more severe the impact of economic 
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indicators on political behavior predictions. If economic safety is undermined, especial-
ly for a significant period of time, unconventionality becomes a more likely choice for 
citizens, despite previous levels of wealth. European governments can expect more 
mass protest and confrontational activism, if the economic recession persists, especial-
ly with an individual’s economic perception of personal wellbeing becoming more rele-
vant in predicting unconventional political activism. 
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Appendix 1: Variable List 
Variable Survey Question Type Source 
Petition During the last 12 months, have you signed a 
petition? 
Categorical  
(no/yes) 
European Social 
Survey 
Demonstration During the last 12 months, have you taken part 
in a lawful demonstration? 
Categorical  
(no/yes) 
European Social 
Survey 
Boycott During the last 12 months, have you boycotted 
certain products? 
Categorical  
(no/yes) 
European Social 
Survey 
Gender Sex of respondent Categorical  
(female/male) 
European Social 
Survey 
Age Age in years Continuous European Social 
Survey 
Education About how many years of education have you 
completed? 
Continuous European Social 
Survey 
Left/Right Scale In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and 
“right”. Where would you place on this scale? 
Scalar 
(0=left, 10=right) 
European Social 
Survey 
Belonging to a 
Religion 
Do you consider yourself as belonging to any 
particular religion or denomination? 
Categorical  
(no/yes) 
European Social 
Survey 
Unemployed > 
than 3 months 
Have you ever been unemployed and seeking 
work for a period of more than three months? 
Categorical  
(no/yes) 
European Social 
Survey 
TV Politics News  On an average weekday, how much of your 
time watching television is spent watching 
news or programmes about politics and cur-
rent affairs?  
Categorical 
(More than 1 hr/0.5 to 1 
hr/Less than 0.5 hr/No 
time at all) 
European Social 
Survey 
Political Interest How interested would you say you are in poli-
tics? 
Scalar (1= Very Interested, 
4= Not at all Interested) 
European Social 
Survey 
Trust in 
Politicians 
How much you personally trust… Scalar (0= No Trust at All, 
10= Complete Trust) 
European Social 
Survey 
Vote Did you vote in the last national election…? Categorical  
(Not eligible/Yes/No) 
European Social 
Survey 
Satisfaction with 
Economy 
On the whole how satisfied are you with the 
present state of the economy in your country? 
Scalar (0= Extremely Dis-
satisfied, 10= Extremely 
Satisfied) 
European Social 
Survey 
Household In-
come Perception 
Which of the descriptions on this card comes 
closest to how you feel about your  
household’s income nowadays?  
Scalar 
(1= Living comfortably on 
present income, 4= Very 
difficult on present in-
come) 
European Social 
Survey 
Importance of 
Money 
How important is it to be rich, have money and 
expensive things? 
Scalar 
(1= Very much like me,6= 
Not like me at all) 
European Social 
Survey 
GDP PPS GDP per capita in PPS - Index (EU28 = 100) Continuous Eurostat 
Youth Unem-
ployment 
Youth unemployment rate - % of active popu-
lation aged 15-24 
Continuous Eurostat 
Real GDP Growth Real GDP growth rate – volume. Percentage 
change on previous year. 
Continuous Eurostat 
Inflation Harmonised Index Consumer Prices - inflation 
rate. Annual average rate of change (%). 
Continuous Eurostat 
ESS Rounds Rounds 6, 5, 4, and 3 Categorical  
(2012/2010/2008/2006) 
European Social 
Survey 
For more information, check www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/questionnaire and ec.europa.eu/eurostat/. 
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